I. Introduction
The original impetus for our research was to analyze some of the possible economic effects of a "peace dividend." While the onset of the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf has diverted attention away from the idea of a peace dividend, there is reason to believe, assuming that the conflict will be of short duration, that there will be continuing pressure to reduce and to restructure defense spending. The purpose of our paper is to investigate the possible sectoral impacts on trade and employment in the United States that might be experienced as a result of an across-the-board reduction in military spending. 1 We do not address the effects of a restructuring of military expenditures. As will become clear from the discussion that follows, we can use our modeling framework to analyze increases as well as reductions in military spending. 2 There may of course be other effects at both the micro and aggregate levels that our modeling approach cannot capture. These effects include the dynamics of adjustment in goods and factor markets and possible impacts working through financial markets and changes in aggregate savings and investment behavior. This suggests the need for a broader and more integrated modeling effort, which is unfortunately something beyond our capability at present.
Using the computational general equilibrium (CGE) Michigan
by changing nonmilitary government purchases. However, as discussed below, prior episodes of substantial reductions in U.S. military expenditures did not follow this path.
We therefore assume that reductions in government military spending will be compensated by shifting expenditures to various components of final demand, including: nondefense government spending; private consumption; investment; and a pro rata reallocation across all nondefense sectors.
We proceed as follows. In Section II we present a brief review of previous research. Section III presents a brief description of the Michigan Model and some discussion of elements of it that are of particular importance to our study. Section IV contains an explanation of and results for the unilateral reductions for the United States, while Section V presents the results for the multilateral experiments. We provide some discussion of the implications of the results and conclude in Section VI. workers. They, as do we, also provided results to facilitate the analysis of a shift towards other sectors of final demand, including consumption and investment among others. Their study was, however, performed in a framework with no modelling of international effects, price changes, or substitution possibilities. Leontief et. al. (1965) was an analysis of the regional impact of a 20% reduction in military expenditures. This model assumed that final demand adjusts to maintain a constant level of employment in the aggregate U.S. economy. It therefore concentrated on the changing industrial and regional composition of employment. Dunne and Smith (1984) used the econometrically based Cambridge Growth Project to calculate the impact of military spending on the U.K. economy. Their experiments involved a cut in military expenditures from 5% of GDP to 3.5% of GDP, the European average. These cuts were accompanied by matching increases in other forms of government spending. Their general conclusion was that this reduction in military expenditures would increase total employment by approximately 100,000 jobs.
II. Previous Research
There have been other studies like our own that have employed CGE methods in an international framework. Liew (1985) used the ORANI model of Australia to assess the impact on international trade, prices, and GNP of a 10% increase in military expenditures. This increase was assumed to be compensated by a reduction in one of three other categories of government spending (i.e., health, education, or welfare), thereby holding total government expenditure constant. Although the results of these three experiments differed somewhat in direction and magnitude, the general message, although quantitatively small in each case, was that an increase in military expenditure would tend to reduce GNP and employment, and create a small merchandise trade deficit. The experiments were consistent in suggesting increased imports, and two of the three experiments suggested a reduction in exports. Liew's results are in line with the other studies mentioned, given the direction of change in military spending.
III. Overview of The Michigan Model
The theoretical structure and equations of the Michigan Model are described in detail in Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 9-36 and 235-47; 1990, pp. 9-35) . For our purposes here, we present a brief overview of the model and call attention to some of its features that are pertinent to the present analysis.
In designing the Michigan Model, the objective was to take into account as many of the microeconomic interconnections among industries and countries as possible.
This disaggregated general equilibrium framework enables us to examine a variety of economic issues that most other computational models cannot address, either because they are too highly aggregated, or because they are specified only in partial equilibrium terms.
Data and Parameters
The current version of the model includes 22 tradable and 7 nontradable industries in 18 industrialized and 16 developing countries, plus an aggregate sector representing the rest of the world. 3 We use a base of 1980 data on trade, production, and employment for all 34 countries, plus constructed measures of the coverage of nontariff barriers (NTBs) for the 18 industrialized countries.
Trade, Production, and Employment
The import and export data are adapted from United Nations trade tapes, with concordances that relate the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) to our version of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) categories.
Information on the gross value of production and employment by ISIC sector is directly calculated or estimated frorn United Nations, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publications on national accounts and labor statistics, and various national statistical sources.
3 The industries are listed in Table 2 and the countries in Table 8 .
Nontariff Barriers
NTBs in the model are represented in two forms: as coverage indices and as tariff equivalents. However, only the coverage indices play a role in the current analysis.
These indices measure the degree to which imports are subject to nontariff restrictions. They serve to reflect the role of existing NTBs in dampening the quantitative response of trade when other changes in the economies take place.
Exchange Rates
In an effort to approximate the functioning of foreign exchange markets, exchange rates are modelled in several different ways. We model the industrialized countries in terms of a flexible exchange rate regime in which exchange rates are determined by the requirement that a country's balance of trade plus an exogenous capital flow be equal to zero. Thus, when an exogenous shock alters the trade balance, the exchange rate is used to restore the trade balance to its initial level. In contrast, most developing countries in the model are assumed to have a system of import licensing with exchange rate pegging. The import licensing scheme in countries with pegged exchange rates is assumed to function in such a way as to assure approximate balance-of-payments equilibrium through a mechanism of proportional rationing of imports. Brazil (1975 ), Chile (1977 ), Israel (1977 , Korea (1980 ), Portugal (1981 ), and Spain (1980 . The Brazilian table is applied to the remaining developing countries. The use of national tables allows for differences in technology among the countries included in the model.
Input-Output Tables
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Coefficients and Elasticities
In general, the coefficients of explanatory variables that appear in the model are calculated from data on production, trade, and employment by sector in each country, from the input-output matrices, and from relevant published estimates of demand and substitution elasticities. The import-demand elasticities used in the model, for all countries, are constructed from the "best guesstimates" of U.S. import-demand elasticities calculated by Stern et al. (1976) . Using the import-demand elasticities together with data on trade, we first calculate the implied elasticities of substitution in demand between imported and home-produced goods in each industry of the United States, and we assume that these same substitution elasticities are valid for all other countries. The implicit import-demand elasticities in the other countries are then derived from these common elasticities of substitution, and they differ across countries due to their differences in shares of trade.
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On the supply side of the model, we use elasticities of substitution between capital and labor in each sector, based upon Zarembka and Chernicoff (1971) . These were estimated from U.S. data, but, due to a dearth of estimates for other countries, are assumed to apply for all countries.
The Model Structure
The model is best thought of as composed of two parts: the country system and the world system. The country system contains separate blocks of equations for the individual tradable and nontradable sectors for each country, and the world system contains a single set of equations for individual tradable sectors for the world as a whole.
The country blocks are used first to determine each country's supplies and demands for goods and currencies on world markets, as functions of exogenous variables, world prices and exchange rates. The supply and demand functions for each country are then combined to provide the input to the world system that permits world prices and exchange rates to be determined.
The world system is the less complicated of the two systems. We start with the export supply and import demand functions from the country equations, which depend on world prices and exchange rates. To get world prices, we add these supplies and demands across all countries and set the difference equal to net demand from the rest of the world. To obtain exchange rates, where these are flexible, we add the value of excess supply across all of the industries in a country and equate the resulting trade balance to an exogenously given capital flow. Once we obtain the world prices for each tradable industry and the exchange rate for each country, we enter them back into the separate country blocks in order to determine the rest of the relevant country-specific variables.
Description of the Exogenous Change Variables
The Michigan Model can be used to analyze price and quantity responses to a number of exogenous changes in the world trading environment. These changes can be represented through the use of some 18 exogenous variables, each referring to a different change in the trading environment. These variables include, for example, changes in import tariffs, changes in export taxes, changes in exchange rates where they are exogenous, and changes in the aforementioned capital flows.
For the current analysis, however, we use only two exogenous change variables, both representing particular kinds of shifts in demand. One is an inter-industry shift variable, denoted ea, that describes a reallocation of final demand across industries.
The other is an intra-industry shift variable, denoted e#3, that captures a shift of demand within an industry from home-produced goods to imports. Since neither of these variables has been described explicitly in earlier work on the Michigan Model, we present here a brief formal statement of the roles that these two shift parameters play.
The demand shift parameters operate through the consumption side of the model, which consists of a representative consumer in each country. The consumer (representing all final demand) maximizes utility, U, derived from the consumption of H an fiprs M home-produced goods, C., and of imports, C. , subject to the constraint of a given level of J J expenditure, E. We assume that the utility function is weakly separable into a CobbDouglas function whose arguments for each industry are themselves linearly homogeneous functions of home and import consumption in that industry. Let a., j = 1,..,n, with n S a = 1, be the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function. Then final demand is the j=1 solution to the following maximization problem:
where n is the number of goods. 6 The intra-industry shift parameters, ,#., enter the J home-import industry aggregation functions, A3, in a manner that will be specified below. 
=E
We now proportionally differentiate the system (3) and (4) using the notation that, for any variable x, ex = d(ln x) = dx/x. When we also substitute in for A from (5),
we obtain the following differentiated functions:
j=1
Using the first order conditions it can be seen that eA3M -eA 3 H M 9 apj 1 . If we define a-to be the elasticity of substitution between home and imported goods, a-. is then given implicitly by the following equation: (3) reduce government borrowing. That is, first, policy makers could redistribute the expenditure to other forms of government spending such as human or physical resources.
Second, the reduction in expenditure could be matched by a reduction in government receipts, thus increasing civilian consumption. Finally, the reduced expenditure could be used to reduce (increase) a budget deficit (surplus), reducing interest rates, and thereby stimulating investment. The three postwar periods experienced each of these policies, but in rather different combinations. Table  1 provides a detailed account of the macroeconomic policies accompanying the demilitarization in each of the three periods noted above and the present period of reduced defense expenditures. Column 1 shows the change in defense spending, while columns 2-4 display the accompanying changes in the other major components of the government budget. From column 4, it can be seen that each period is associated with falling budget deficits. In each of the postwar periods, 30% or more of the reduction in military spending was used to reduce the budget deficit. In the current period, the decline in the deficit exceeds the reduction in military spending.
In the immediate post-WWII and post-Korean conflict years, a significant portion of the reduced defense spending was used to offset federal government receipts, as displayed in column 3. The latter two time periods have, however, been associated respectively with a zero and positive change in receipts, as a percent of GNP. The propensity for shifting expenditure from defense to human resources increased throughout the first three periods, while the current demilitarization is accompanied by a fall in human resources spending.f As Steuerle and Wiener note, the late-Reagan-early-Bush era of reduced defense spending is rather uncharacteristic. The period from 1986 to 1989 witnessed a reduction in defense spending, as a percent of GNP, a reduction in spending on human resources, an increase in total revenue, and a reduction in the deficit of almost four times the reduction in defense spending. The uncharacteristic nature of this period is not surprising given that this is the first large-scale peace-time demilitarization.
It is evident from these experiences that there have been a variety of In interpreting the results to follow, it is important to note the assumptions that are common to all scenarios:
(1) The level of aggregate expenditure is constant.
(2) Capital stocks are fixed for each industry, on the grounds that the time period under investigation is too short for changes in investment to be realized as additions to the capital stock.
(3) Real wages are assumed to be flexible, i.e., labor markets are permitted to clear.
(4) The U.S. Department of Defense is assumed to follow a "buy American" policy. All defense expenditure is assumed to have been allocated to domestic industry.
(5) Exchange rates are modeled as flexible, except for a number of developing countries.
Some of these assumptions are in need of further explanation or justification.
First, the assumption that aggregate expenditure is held constant is necessary because the microeconomic orientation of the Michigan Model makes it inappropriate for discussing macroeconomic phenomena such as the determination of aggregate expenditure or employment. Implicit within this assumption, and the form of each scenario, is that a dollar-for-dollar transfer is made. For example, with a reduction in the budget deficit it is assumed that investment changes by exactly the amount of the change in the deficit.
Further effects of the changed interest rate would likely be changes in consumers' savingsconsumption choices. Such effects are not represented explicitly in the Michigan Model.
A further consequence of the microeconomic nature of the model is assumption Table 2 reports actual 1985 levels of consumption, investment, government nondefense, and defense spending. Table 3 Table 4b shows what happens to final demand and demand shares when $150 million, or 25%, of defense spending is shifted to other final demand.
The process begins by reducing the value of defense in each cell by 25%. Thus, column 1 in Table 4b is 75% of column 1 in Table 4a . This $150 million is then redistributed across other final demand in proportion to each sector's share in total other demand. For example, other final demand in sector 1 is 50% of total other demand and, therefore, increases by $75 million, 50% of the reduction in military spending. As can be seen from column 4 of each table, the redistribution causes the as to change significantly.
As discussed above, the proportional changes, eas, are needed for carrying out the experirnents. For sector 1, we have:
The other changes in shares are calculated analogously.
It is also convenient to use For both exports and imports the world price in the industry, PW, is translated into domestic currency by multiplying by the exchange rate, R. In the absence of any Is export taxes or subsidies, this gives the export price, PX. The supply of exports depends upon this price, as well as the price in the home market, again because of the use of home market goods as inputs into production for export. 13
The price facing importers, PM, is also given by RPW, except that it is augmented by t, representing the ad valorem tariff together with the tariff equivalent of any nontariff barrier that may be present. Thus the demand curve is drawn as a function of PM, as well as, again, having its position depend on the home price from the other panel.
A cut in defense expenditure has two effects, as already noted. First, depending upon where defense expenditure was concentrated compared to the pattern of expenditure in the category of final demand to which that expenditure is shifted, total demand in some industries will rise and in other industries will fall. We will look at both cases in turn. Second, even in industries where total demand declines, and certainly in ones where demand expands, there is a shift from defense spending, which was devoted exclusively to home goods, to other demand that is spent partly on imports. This means that there is an additional leftward shift of the home-sector demand curve and a rightward shift of the import demand curve.
Consider, then, an industry in which there has been no defense spending. The cut in defense spending will therefore, at initial prices, unambiguously increase total demand in that industry, as well as increasing demands for both imported and home produced goods there. This is shown in Figure 2 by the shifts of the two demand curves to D 1 (P )and D1(PO). As long as the world price and the exchange rate do not change, the prices of exports and imports in the sector will remain constant. However, the shift in 1 demand in the home sector requires a price increase there, to PH, and this induces a further shift in both supply and demand for exports and imports. The demand for imports ' 3 Of course inputs from other sectors are typically more important than inputs from the same industry represented here. Other than this input-price effect, the Michigan Model does not include any direct effect of the home price on export supply, or vice versa, since capital is assumed specific to each subsector and labor can be hired independently in each.
shifts further to the right, to D>(P1), due to substitution away from higher priced home goods. And the supply of exports shifts to the left, to SX(PH), due to the higher prices of inputs from the home sector. Thus the result at this point is a rise in output in the home sector, a fall in exports, and a rise in imports.
These results could change somewhat, however, if there is a change in prices of exports and imports, though this is not shown in the diagram. If the country is large in the world market, then its increased net demand for imports will raise the world price, PW. In addition, if the increase in net imports here applies to other industries as well, then the worsening of the trade balance will lead to a depreciation of the currency, that is a rise in R, which will also raise the domestic currency prices of traded goods. On the export side, a price increase for either of these reasons will tend to offset the decline in exports shown in Figure 2 , and may even lead exports in certain sectors to increase overall.
On the import side, the possible price increase for these two reasons may in addition be enhanced by still another possibility. If the industry being considered is covered by a nontariff barrier, then the attempt to increase imports will lead to a rise in the tariff equivalent of the barrier, and thus to a rise in t, raising the price of imports still further. Thus for three reasons PM may rise, and if it does the changes in Figure 2 will be further complicated. Such a rise in PM will lead to a further upward shift in DH, plus an upward shift in SH, possibly changing the quantity in the home market from that shown in Figure 2 , and surely increasing the price there still further. The additional price increase will also lead to further shifts of supply and demand for trade, and so on. The end result can therefore not be obtained with certainty from the diagram. However, all of these secondary shifts seem unlikely to change in a substantial way the results that are shown in Figure 2 , which may therefore still be of use in understanding the results of the more complicated interactions captured by the Michigan Model. Figure 3 shows the opposite extreme case, where defense expenditure in an industry is cut substantially and only a small amount of new final demand is created in the same industry, thus reducing total demand. The demand curve in the home sector therefore shifts to the left, to DA(PH ), while the demand curve for imports shifts slightly to the right, to DA1(Ph). The price in the home market therefore falls in this case, to P1, and this shifts both the supply of exports and the demand for imports down. The results, therefore, are a rise in exports and a fall in imports (assuming, as shown, that the initial increase in import demand is small compared to the effect of the drop in the home price).
Here again, there could be further adjustment of prices if there are changes in world prices, the exchange rate, or the tariff equivalent of a nontariff barrier, and in this case the effects would tend to go in the opposite direction from what we discussed in connection with Figure 2 . However, since over the entire economy the defense cut replaces spending that was only in home sectors with other spending that goes partly to imports, the case of an exchange rate depreciation that was considered there seems the much more likely one.
To sum up, our theoretical analysis suggests that home-sector prices will rise in some sectors and fall in others due to a shift of expenditure out of defense, with corresponding changes in home-sector outputs. As a first approximation, imports rise and exports fall in sectors where demand expands, while the opposite is likely where demand contracts. However, because of the overall shift toward imports with the cut in defense, the currency is likely to depreciate, and this tends to raise prices across the board.
Computational Results
The Michigan CGE model produces results for a wide range of endogenous variables that emerge from the calculations as percentage changes for each of the 29
sectors. Base year data, 1980 in this study, are then used to compute absolute changes for selected variables, e.g., exports, imports, and employment. In what follows we discuss all four scenarios, but emphasize the results of the first experiment, that of a shift from defense to all other sources of final demand. The other three scenarios will be discussed subsequently.
Scenario 1: Redistributing Spending Across Total Final Demand
The aggregate results for the United States for each of the four scenarios are presented in Table 5 . Column 1 of Table 3 with partition 1 of Table 7 that all sectors in which imports decline had a decrease in domestic demand. For two sectors in which demand falls, miscellaneous manufacturing (38A) and nonelectric machinery (382), the exogenous increases in imports are enough to outweigh the substitution effect resulting from the reduced home price. As a result, they each experience an increase in imports. This is the case for 16 of the 22 sectors modeled. Of the six remaining sectors experiencing a reduction in demand, five show a negligible decline in imports. The sixth, transport equipment (384), shows a decline of 4.4 percent or $1.4 billion. The decline in this sector alone is enough to offset the combined increase in the other sectors.
The sectoral changes in exports are much less surprising. As can be seen from partition 1 of Table 6 , 19 of the tradable sectors experience a small decline in exports, with leather products (323) experiencing the largest decline in percentage terms, 1.6%, while the value of exports in food, beverage, and tobacco (310) declines the most, $190 million.
The response of these sectors is consistent with the intuition described above. The sectoral impact on exports is more evenly distributed than previously and of a larger magnitude in each industry. The aggregate reduction in imports remains concentrated in the durable goods industries and is, again, largely due to the disproportionately large reduction in demand for goods produced by the transportation 15Recall that the assumption regarding defense purchases was that, within industries, defense purchases were disproportionately from home suppliers. That a greater proportion of defense spending is from traded sectors is consistent with this assumption.
equipment industry (384).
Scenario 3: Redistributing Spending Across Consumption
The results of the third scenario reflect a shift in spending from defense to consumption. This shift is intended to represent a reduction in taxes as a response to reduced military expenditures.
The aggregate results in Table 5 This restructuring of final demand shows a slightly weaker impact on traded goods than did the previous scenario. As reported in Table 6 , there is a shift of 177.4
thousand person-years from traded to nontraded industries. This is, again, a reflection of the higher propensity of consumers to purchase nontraded goods relative to that of the DOD. Private consumers place a much greater emphasis on purchases from wholesale and retail trade (6), and finance, insurance, and real estate (8) than does the DOD. Partition 3 of Table 6 shows that employment in wholesale and retail trade (6), and finance, insurance, and real estate (8) increase significantly, while workers in the durable goods industries (381, 382, 383, 384, and 38A) and sector 9 bear the brunt of the dislocations.
The sectoral impact on exports is uniformly negative, reflecting the currency appreciation and increased demand in most sectors. The impact on imports conforms to a priori expectations. In sectors where demand increases, imports increase and, conversely, imports fall in sectors with decreasing demand.
Scenario 4: Redistributing Spending Across Private Fixed Investment
The final unilateral scenario is a shift in spending to private fixed investment.
This scenario is intended to mimic a reduction in the budget deficit accompanying a reduction in military expenditures. The reduced budget deficit presumably causes interest rates to fall and consequently encourages private fixed investment. The results for this scenario are strikingly different from the preceding ones. The increase in investment demands leads to an increase in both exports and imports. The number of worker dislocations is also largest for this type of a shift. It is interesting to note, from partition 4
of Table 3 , that demand increases significantly in only four sectors: furniture and fixtures (332), nonelectric machinery (382), construction (5), and wholesale and retail trade (6).
This is due to the high level of concentration of investment expenditures. The expenditure in these four sectors is significantly greater than that of the remaining sectors.
The sectoral results present a very interesting picture. Partition 4 of Table 6 indicates that employment increases in 17 of the 22 traded sectors. This happens despite a decline in demand for 20 of the traded sectors. There is also a net transfer of 196.9
thousand person-years from the nontraded sectors to the traded sectors.
The phenomenon of increasing employment accompanying decreasing domestic demand can be explained by the resulting change in exports, noted in partition 4 of Table   7 . The declining domestic demand, resulting in a lower home price for the good, combined with a depreciation of the dollar leads to an increase in exports in all sectors, with the exception of wood products (331). This increase in exports is in most cases sufficient to offset the employment effects of the reduced domestic demand.
The sectoral effects on imports are driven, to a large extent, by the exogenous increase caused by the shift away from defense purchases. Sectors not receiving an exogenous increase in imports generally experience a decline and, conversely, those with an exogenous increase generally experience increased imports.
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Summry
The results of the first three scenarios are qualitatively similar while the fourth The aggregate obtained was distributed to replicate the share in final demand for each of the 29 sectors. Leontief and Duchin (1983) provide estimates of the proportion of the ACDA data on aggregate military expenditures that correspond to 12 categories. We in turn concorded these categories to our industrial classification. They also provide estimates of the decomposition of the ACDA data by sector for 15 regions of the world. We used these regional breakdowns for each of the 33 countries to correspond to their location within the individual regions.
Computational Results
The summary results for the United States of the multilateral 25% reduction in military expenditures are presented in Table 8 . The effects on other countries will be The reduction in exports reflects the dollar appreciation and a decline in world prices. Global defense spending is primarily focused on the purchase of goods that are traded internationally, especially durable goods and basic metal industries. The ' 9 See Grobar and Stern (1989) and Grobar, Stern, and Deardorff (1990) for further details and estimates and analysis of the economic effects of international trade in armaments for 1980. multilateral reduction in defense spending thus reduces the world demand for traded goods.
This reduced demand is then translated into lower world prices. In response to the lower prices, domestic producers shift away from export production to home production, thereby reducing exports.
The sectoral results for imports, partition 4 of Table 9 , to the extent that they differ from those of the unilateral simulations, also reflect the lower world prices. Imports increase in 17 of the 22 sectors. Sectors with a decline in imports experience a smaller decline and conversely for sectors with a rise in imports. Recall that ISIC 384 was responsible for the bulk of the reduction in imports in the unilateral runs. The multilateral scenario produces a greater decline in the world price for sector 384, and consequently reduces the decline in imports by approximately 25%.
In the aggregate, a multilateral reduction in military spending thus appears to have a somewhat larger impact on the U.S. economy than does a unilateral reduction. At the sectoral level, while some industries may experience a larger impact, the differences appear to be fairly small.
VI. Conclusions and Implications
In the long run, a reduction in defense spending is generally regarded to have a positive impact on an economy. In the short run, however, a reduction in defense outlays could result in unemployment and adjustment pressures in at least some sectors of the economy. In order to facilitate a smooth transition, government assistance, if deemed necessary, should be pointed in the right direction. The CGE results that we have reported based on the Michigan Model are useful in assessing the sectoral impact of a reduction in military expenditures.
While it is not entirely under the control of government, it may be possible to influence whether nondefense government, consumption, or investment spending expands in response to reductions in rnilitary spending. The decision of which policy to follow is largely outside the scope of this paper. That is, whether reduced military spending is used to meet other federal spending needs, to reduce taxes allowing for higher consumption or personal savings, or to cut the federal deficit resulting in higher domestic investment, must be decided on the basis of many considerations not discussed here.
While the impacts of a 25% unilateral or multilateral reduction in military expenditures do not appear to be large in the aggregate, our computational results suggest that the sectoral impacts differ significantly depending on the accompanying macroeconomic policy. It also appears that certain specific sectors may bear the brunt of the adjustment costs and therefore would be in need of assistance in the event that reduced military spending may in fact be carried out. 
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